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Scholars should not just assume that populism is bad for
democracy, but should instead concentrate on explaining
populism’s positive and negative effects.
by Blog Admin
With the rise of technocratic government in the wake of the eurocrisis, many now argue that
populism is bad for democracy. Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser argues that this view is wrong-
headed, and that there is no cross-regional research into the impacts of populism on
democracy. Academics now need to focus on further empirical investigations into populism and
its effects on liberal democracies, which may be positive or negative.
Is populism good or bad f or democracy? This question has received increasing attention in
the last years. Most recently, Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti called f or a meeting of
European heads of  state to discuss the growing negative inf luence of  populist f orces in Europe. Similar
warnings have been issued not only in the United States due to the rise of  the Tea Party movement, but
also in Latin America because of  the electoral triumph of  lef t ist populist presidents such as Hugo Chávez in
Venezuela. Despite this increasing worry about the emergence of  populist leaders and parties, there is
almost no cross-regional research on the impact of  populism on democracy. While it is true that the amount
of  studies on one singular case (e.g. Evo Morales in Bolivia) or a set of  similar cases in a particular region
(e.g. populist radical right parties in Europe) has been growing in the last decade, there is a scarcity of
works that try to develop a broad comparative perspective to grasp the ambivalent relationship between
populism and democracy.
To f ill part of  this research gap, my colleague Cas Mudde and I edited the book, Populism in Europe and the
Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy?, published earlier this year. It includes contributions on eight
countries in Europe and the Americas: Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Mexico, Peru, Slovakia
and Venezuela. In consonance with much of  the existing scholarship, populism is def ined in this book as a
thin-centred ideology, which is based not only on a dualist distinction between ‘the pure people’ and ‘the
corrupt elite’, but also on the def ence of  popular sovereignty at any cost. Our book of f ers two novelties to
those who are interested in studying the impact of  populism on democracy.
 Populism: threat and corrective for democracy
Academics and pundits alike are prone to assume that populism is bad f or democracy. However, some
scholars and commentators do argue that populism can help increasing the quality of  the democratic
regime. This debate between f oes and f riends of  populism is related to the f act that we normally have the
liberal democratic model in our mind. Liberal democracy is characterised by the coexistence of  popular
sovereignty and majority rule with constitutional courts, and other institutional bodies that are neither
elected nor directly controlled by ‘we, the people’. Accordingly, the liberal democratic model relies on two
dif f erent pillars that maintain anything but a harmonious relationship. Given that populist f orces endorse
popular sovereignty at any cost, it is true that populism can have a negative impact on the liberal
democratic regime, particularly when it comes to def ending minority rights and independent constitutional
bodies. Nevertheless, it is important to consider that populism can also have a posit ive impact on the liberal
democratic regime, because it can help to integrate the ideas and interests of  marginalised sections of  the
electorate into the polit ical agenda.
This ambivalent relationship between populism and democracy is summarized in the f ollowing table, which
of f ers a schematic view of  the posit ive and negative ef f ects of  populism on the liberal democratic regime
that are identif ied in the theoretical f ramework of  the book. The point to be made about this table is that it
not only disentangles many arguments that are present in the academic and public debate, but also of f ers
a set of  propositions that can be tested empirically to analyse whether populism works as a threat or a
corrective f or democracy. Otherwise stated, instead of  producing studies that take f or granted that
populism is good or bad f or democracy, scholarly ef f orts should f ocus on demonstrating empirically where,
why and how populism has posit ive or negative ef f ects on liberal democracy. 
Table 1 – Posit ive and negative effects that populism can have on liberal democratic regimes 
Posit ive effects Negative effects
Populism can give voice to groups that do not f eel
represented by the elites, by putting topics
relevant to the ‘silent majority’
Populism can use the notion and praxis of  popular
sovereignty to contravene the ‘check and balances’
Populism can mobilise excluded sections of
society, improving their polit ical integration
Populism can use the notion and praxis of  majority
rule to circumvent minority rights
Populism can represent excluded sections of
society by implementing policies that they pref er
Populism can promote the establishment of  a new
polit ical cleavage, which impedes the f ormation of
stable polit ical coalit ions
Populism can provide an ideological bridge that
supports the building of  important social and
polit ical coalit ions, of ten across class lines
Populism can lead to a moralisation of  polit ics,
making consensus extremely dif f icult (if  not
impossible)
Populism can increase democratic accountability,
by making issues and policies part of  the polit ical
realm
Populism can f oster a plebiscitary transf ormation
of  polit ics, which undermines the legit imacy of
polit ical institutions and unelected bodies
Populism can bring back the conf lictive dimension
of  polit ics (‘democratisation of  democracy’)
Ironically, by advocating an opening up of  polit ical
lif e to non-elites, populism can easily promote a
shrinkage of  ‘the polit ical’
Dealing with populism
Another aspect that has received increasing academic and public attention is the question about the
existence of  dif f erent strategies to deal with populist f orces. Can we learn lessons f rom current
manif estations of  populism in Europe and the Americas, particularly in terms of  the ‘toolkit ’ that liberal
democracies have to cope with this phenomenon? While the case studies of  the book of f er interesting
answers to this question, I would like to f ocus here on the concluding chapter, in which f our general
strategies to deal with populist f orces are identif ied: conf rontation, isolation, adaptation and socialisation.
Those who promote conf rontation take f or granted that populism is a democratic disease that needs to be
attacked and eradicated. Ironically, this way of  thinking tends to replicate the populist worldview: given that
certain actors are dangerous, they should be censored and conf ronted. There is no better example of  this
than the support of  sections of  the Venezuelan (f ormer) elites and the U.S. government of  President
George W. Bush to the military coup against Hugo Chávez in 2002. The strategy of  isolation is less radical,
but is also based on the argument that populism is a democratic pathology that has to be kept in
quarantine. The idea behind this medical metaphor is that the claims made by populist leaders are not
legit imate. As a consequence, it is necessary to make a clear distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’: on the one
hand, there are the (self -proclaimed) ‘good democrats’, and on the other hand, there are the ‘evil populist
f orces’. The reaction of  the European Union to the f ormation of  a government coalit ion in Austria between
Schüssel’s Christian Democratic Party and Haider ’s populist radical right party is a good example of  this.
In contrast to the strategy of  isolation and conf rontation, adaptation does not rely on a moralisation of
polit ics. In f act, those who adhere to the logic of  adaptation either implicit ly or explicit ly accept that
populism can f unction as a democratic corrective, since it may well direct the attention of  the establishment
to topics that they have not previously considered. Take, f or instance, the role that Evo Morales’
ethnopopulism has played in putting the problem of  racial discrimination and oppression at the centre of
the polit ical agenda in contemporary Bolivia. Finally, the strategy of  socialisation can be seen as
complementary to adaptation, and it ref ers to short- term and long-term tactics that aim to include the
populist f orces in the polit ical establishment. This implies a sort of  de-radicalisation of  the populist actors,
particularly in terms of  making policy compromises and accepting the rules of  public contestation that are
inherent to liberal democracy. To a certain extent, some of  the European populist radical right parties that
have been able to participate in a coalit ion government have experienced this process of  socialisation (f or
more details about this, see the recent article of  T jitske Akkerman and Sarah L. de Lange about ‘Radical
Right Parties in Of f ice’ published in the journal Government and Opposition).
On Thursday, 18 October, Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser will be launching the new book Populism in Europe and
the Americas: Threat or Corrective f or Democracy? at an event hosted by Counterpoint in London. More
details.
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